Modern military evolutionary acquisition and the ramifications of RAMS by Gaver, Donald P. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2005
Modern military evolutionary acquisition
and the ramifications of RAMS
Gaver, Donald P.



















Modern Military Evolutionary Acquisition and the 





Donald P. Gaver 
Patricia A. Jacobs 







               Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
                                                    Prepared for:  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 
                   The Pentagon, Room 3E318 




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 









This report was prepared for and funded by the Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation, The Pentagon, Room 3E318, Washington, DC  20301-1700. 
 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
 





DONALD P. GAVER  PATRICIA A. JACOBS 
Distinguished Professor of  
Operations Research 
 Professor of Operations Research 
   
   
   
   
ERNEST A. SEGLIE   
Science Advisor, Director,  
Operational Test and Evaluation 
  
   
Reviewed by:   
   
   
   
   
LYN R. WHITAKER   
Associate Chairman for Research   
Department of Operations Research  Released by: 
   
   
   
   
JAMES N. EAGLE  LEONARD A. FERRARI, Ph.D. 
Chairman  Associate Provost and Dean of Research  
Department of Operations Research   
 
i 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Technical Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Modern Military Evolutionary Acquisition and the 
Ramifications of “RAMS” 
6. AUTHOR(S) Donald P. Gaver, Patricia A. Jacobs, and Ernest A. Seglie 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
ROR28 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER    NPS-OR-05-006 
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This paper describes the administrative philosophy that currently guides the (evolutionary) acquisition of U.S. military 
systems. It then sketches a preliminary mathematical model that allows study of the effect of various ways to spend a fixed 
budget for Block b+1 upgrade so as to obtain a maximum expected number of fielded system upgrades that is effective in the 
field. This includes the option of simply fielding more of the previous, Block b, design units. Effectiveness/“capability” 
growth is the design objective, but testing and fault removal provides for reliability growth. The model accounts for various 
levels of developmental and testing effort at various rates, and for obsolescence of the previous (Block b) and forthcoming 




















15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
20 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  evolutionary acquisition; operational testing; reliability growth 



















MODERN MILITARY EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION 
AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF “RAMS” 
Donald P. Gaver and Patricia A. Jacobs 
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Rd., Rm. 239, Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943 
Ernest A. Seglie 
Science Advisor, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 
The Pentagon, Rm. 3E318 
Washington, DC  20301-1700 
Abstract 
 
This paper describes the administrative philosophy that currently 
guides the (evolutionary) acquisition of U.S. military systems. It then 
sketches a preliminary mathematical model that allows study of the 
effect of various ways to spend a fixed budget for Block b+1 upgrade 
so as to obtain a maximum expected number of fielded system 
upgrades that is effective in the field. This includes the option of 
simply fielding more of the previous, Block b, design units. 
Effectiveness/“capability” growth is the design objective, but testing 
and fault removal provides for reliability growth. The model accounts 
for various levels of developmental and testing effort at various rates, 
and for obsolescence of the previous (Block b) and forthcoming  
(Block b+1) system versions. 
Keywords: evolutionary acquisition; operational testing; reliability growth 
1 The Current (2004-05) Acquisition System 
Modern (circa ‘04-‘05) U.S. military acquisition follows a top-down policy pattern, 
governed by a Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This 
informs and supports decisions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the  
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which identifies, assesses, and prioritizes joint 
military capability needs. JCIDS is concerned with methodology to identify and 
describe so-called capability gaps, review capability improvement proposals and 
improve capability integration, define non-materiel (e.g., Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS)) aspects of materiel solutions, improve interdepartmental (Joint) 
coordination, improve requirement generation, adaptation and revision, and 
documentation, all in a timely manner; timeliness is intended to be enhanced by  
spiral development and evolutionary acquisition. Program progress occurs according 
to milestones: a new mission requirement (e.g., induced by changed threat 
assessment) is described in an Initial Capability Document (ICD) prior to  
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Milestone (MS) A, at which time T&E strategy (a new name for what was formerly 
called a first version of the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, or TEMP), is defined, 
and must be approved at Department of Defense (DoD) level. Then a Capability 
Development Document (CDD) is due by MS B, and a Capability Production 
Document (CPD) at MS C. For major programs, the program manager (PM) submits a 
TEMP that must be approved by Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 
officials for MSs B and C, and to lead to Full Rate Production (FRP), and to fielding. 
1.1 The TEMP 
A vital element of the above process is the creation, updating, and evolution of the 
TEMP. This paper will discuss issues that should be addressed by the TEMP as it 
guides a presently more dynamic process than has been in place in the past. To quote 
a recent instruction (DoDI 5000.2 (2003) E5.4.1): “The Test and Evaluation Master 
Plan shall describe planned developmental, operational, and live fire testing including 
measures to evaluate the performance of the system during these test periods; an 
integrated test schedule; and the resource requirements to accomplish the planned 
testing.” No specific guidance is given on how to plan testing or how to integrate the 
testing into a schedule for spiral development or evolutionary acquisition. This 
present paper elucidates features of a useful and successful dynamic TEMP, 
emphasizing the use of models (and simulation as required) and data acquisition and 
analysis in that process. Special emphasis is given here to the use of testing to 
enhance various Suitability issues; these include obtaining a system that can be placed 
satisfactorily in field use, with special attention to Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability, and Safety, (RAMS). Also included are transportability, 
interoperability and manpower and logistic supportability, robustness to environment, 
(e.g. weather and terrain) and training requirements. However, testing is first and 
foremost invoked to demonstrate improved and required Operational Effectiveness, 
meaning the degree of improved mission performance over a current system version 
(Block, or baseline), where the focus is effectiveness against changing threats, 
meaning relative invulnerability against weapons and countermeasures while 
accomplishing its mission(s). Mission accomplishment is fundamental, and 
quantitative measures of effectiveness and suitability should be correctly defined and 
constantly updated. For this, testers must rely on earlier data, e.g., from 
developmental Testing (DT)/subsystem/component testing, which, in turn, will be 
guided by preliminary modeling (and simulation). It should be demonstrated early on 
that the entire system can be manufactured and integrated, and that it is transportable 
and sustainable. Useful and cost-effective Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
(IOT&E) must depend on information from earlier development and from experience 
with other systems, and the application of scientific knowledge and insight. Testing 
must be designed and adequate to cope with defined (presently understood) missions 
having a quantified need, definitions and measures of mission accomplishment, 
realistic conditions for testing, and capability to interact with other systems. 
Robustness and work-arounds when unexpected events (system failures or threat 
modification) occur are highly valuable, and should be effectively tested. Adaptability 
is an essential system-wide feature. 
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1.2 Testing and the Design Modification Process: Fault Removal, Block-Block 
Transition/Up-Grading 
The environment for testing under the present more static acquisition philosophy has 
changed to recognize system design evolution; c.f. DoDD 5000.1 (2003), Daly et al. 
(2003), Seglie (2002). If a system has evolved to Block b, then changes 
(improvements!) leading to Block b+1 are in principle being studied and tested at the 
prototype “brass board” level; at some point Block b+1 is operationally tested using 
Block b as baseline, and will be accepted when Block b+1 is “measurably better” than 
the baseline. Fault (resulting from inadequate design, manufacturing, transportability, 
maintainability) removal can occur both within Block b (even after fielding, but at 
higher cost). A “real option” is to examine several alternative technologies and 
CONOPS, and select the “measurably best,” considering end-to-end  
cost-effectiveness and including estimates of the timing of technological and 
operational obsolescence, likely caused by development of countermeasures by the 
enemy. Perhaps several alternative versions of Block b+1 can be acquired and fielded 
for different mission types, and to forestall countermeasures. The process of balancing 
the development process: the Test, Analyze, Fix, Test (TAFT) action sequence, 
followed by field Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) is designed to yield useful 
and trustworthy improvement in timely fashion (e.g., before Block b penalizing 
attrition or obsolescence). A central problem is to address both the “effectiveness, or 
capability gap closure” problem, and, importantly, also to address the “reliability 
growth” problem realistically and recognizing end-to-end system requirements, 
important elements being that the new (sub)system version interoperates effectively 
with other system elements under the entire range of mission alternatives envisioned. 
1.3 Models and Analysis to Expedite Cost-Effective Transition Between Blocks 
(and Within Blocks) 
We outline and propose rational attacks on the basic decision problem: when and how 
to allocate resources (basically, funding, but also previous experience) to Block b to 
b+1 transition. The particular models described in this paper are simple and 
preliminary, serving to illustrate the basic issues encountered when a sequence of 
block upgrades is the evolutionary acquisition strategy. More details are given 
elsewhere. Of course, each system requires its individual understanding and 
characterization—one that captures essential physical/operational features, but does 
not dwell on minutia.  
At any time point/date there will be a certain number, B(b; t), of surviving and useable 
copies of Block b. One option is to continue with that number, recognizing that 
attrition and obsolescence will reduce that Block b’s mission effectiveness, even if the 
Block b stock (e.g., number of current design copies) is increased over time. The cost 
of this option will likely grow due to probable increased need for field repairs, and 
consequent minor modifications and force enhancements. Also, effectiveness and 
reliability (actually RAMS) may well diminish. We propose to construct and analyze 
stochastic models for this option. An alternative option is to introduce Block b+1 to 
field use, after the entire TAFT (b+1) process, conducted in both Developmental 
Testing (DT) and Operational Testing (OT) phases. We propose (further) 
development of models to guide timing of such a transition, taking explicit account of 
costs of design, DT and Operational (field) Testing. An initial simplified version of 
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the advisability and timing of such a transition appears in Gaver et al. (2004). A more 
comprehensive model is under construction that recognizes that many to most systems 
function roughly sequentially, activating in succession various sub(sub)system 
functional stages (consider a missile that must first experience launch, then initial, 
midcourse, and final stage propulsion and guidance, and final activation of the 
warhead). Clearly end-to-end testing must assure that all such stages are activated so 
that design faults can be revealed—and “Fixed”; the latter process is error-prone, so 
more testing is required; indications of “how much (more) is enough” can be assessed 
by realistic models, but the crucial ultimate test is experimental/operational.  
Gaver et al. (2003) has discussed the properties of such reliability growth models that 
explicitly recognize stage-wise system architecture and more detailed and sequential 
(current-experience-based) test-stopping rules. These will be adapted to evaluate the 
cost-effective policy for Block-to-Block transition—i.e., rationalize the pace of 
evolutionary acquisition. 
2 A Simplified Formal Model for Performance 
The probability of mission success for Block b+1 after development and testing 
depends on the funding allocated to development and its rate of expenditure. The 
development process should not only increase the effectiveness of Block b+1, but also 
tends to introduce design defects (DDs) that testing can remove. We consider a 
system that can be used once, such as a missile. This model was introduced in  
Gaver et al. (2004). 
 
Let T b  be the total (calendar) time to develop, test, and manufacture Block b+1; 
here  is a fixed “spiral time,” which is only one alternative. 
( 1d +
( 1dT b +
)
) ( )( )1dM T b +  
represents the total funds allocated to Develop Block b+1; 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 /d d dm M T b T b+ +1T b + =
(
 is the average rate of that expenditure (ignoring 
feedback adjustments to intermediate events—successes and failures). A plausible, if 
speculative, model for the performance (Effectiveness) of Block b+1 is the fraction of 
an objective mission success measure (“requirement”) after expenditures of 
)( )1d b +M T ( at rate )( )1dm T b + , given that any remaining DDs, new or old, do not 
activate during a mission, will be written in the general form: 
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )*1; 1 ; 1 1 1; 1 ; 1d d d d d dp b T b M T p b G b M T b m T b+ + + = + + + + ; (1) 
 
where (a)  is a goal level (“requirement”) for mission success of Block b+1 
(realistically this could be the maximum of various minimum acceptable measures of 
mission success, related to a Pareto optimum); while (b) 
 is the fraction of the maximum, (a), achieved by 
the development process, when development budget is allocated to be 
(* 1p b +
( )( 1d dM T b+ +
)
))( ) ( )(1; ; 1dG b m T b +
( )( )1dM T b +  
expended at basic average rate ( )( )1b +dm T  over time period ( )1dT b + . 
 
We provide specific parametric illustrations in Appendix 1. It is anticipated that 
 should increase at a decreasing rate with ( )dG • ( )dM • , but that an inordinately high 
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rate of redesign and system modification (large ( )m • ) will have a detrimental effect 
on the Block improvement. Note that an optimum rate is impossible to determine for a 
new/revised system, but studies of the effects of successive development (“spiral”) 
times, , can guide the choice of budgets and rates of expenditure. dT
(E b
1;








Let the number of DDs introduced during initial development have a Poisson 
distribution with conditional expected value ( )( ) ( )) 01; 1 ; 1 |d dM T b T b + + + D K . 
 is introduced to represent a combined deterministic and random component of 
between-copy variability in Block b+1. The Poisson is an acceptable distribution. 
0K
 
DT and OT are pooled in this model. Each remaining DD is activated during a test 
with probability1 θ θ− = . Several DDs may be activated during a test. Any DDs 
activated during a test are presumed to be removed (an optimistic  
simplifying assumption). 
 
The testing policy is to allocate ( )1dT bτ +  DT/OT tests: The parameter τ  is an 
average number of DT/OT tests conducted per spiral time unit.  Each test uses one 
copy of Block b+1. The conditional distribution of the number of DDs remaining after 
development and testing, given , has a distribution with mean 0K
( )( ) ( )( ) 0| + D K1 ; 1 ;d dE b M T b T b τ+ + . 
 
DDs remaining in Block b+1 after fielding have the potential of causing mission 
failure if activated during a mission. Let Fθ  be the probability with which a DD 
remaining in Block b+1 after fielding does not activate during a mission. The 
conditional probability of mission success for Block b+1, given completion of 
development and testing, and given the number of remaining DDs, is 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) )( 1; 1 1 ;
1; 1 ; 1 ;
1 ; 1
F d d
b M T b
d d d F
p b b M T b T b
p b T b M T b
τ
τ
θ + + +
+ + + +
+ + D
D
.    (2) 
 
All fielded copies of Block b+1 have the same remaining DDs since all are 
constructed by the currently evolved design. This is a oversimplification that can  
be relaxed. 
 
2.1 Parametric Examples 
a) Let , a constant and the conditional distribution of DDs introduced during 
development is Poisson. Then the probability that, after fielding, no remaining DDs 
activate during a mission is 
k=
 
( )( ) ( ) )
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }
















   
 + − 
D
,               (3) 
where ]f    is an (ultimately) increasing function of )m   . 
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b) Assume  is random with gamma distribution of scale 0K 0ν >  and shape parameter 




−    =    + 
K . This classical modification of the 
Poisson leads to the Negative Binomial. The expression for the probability of no DDs 
activating during a field mission (field mission survival): 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )




















   
 =  +   −  
D
 
                          (4) 
 
Further randomization is possible and tractable (e.g., randomization of β  in the above 
exponent). Such a step can be interpreted in a Bayes manner or as a sensitivity test. 
 
c) Let  be random obeying a positive stable law with scale 0K% 0ν >  and order 
0 1β< <  and Laplace transform ( ){ }0 expsE e s βν−  = −  K% ; see Feller II (1966). 
Assume  is the minimum of the stable random variable and a truncating 
exponential random variable having mean1/
0K
κ ; in this case the Laplace transform of 
 is 0K ( )( ){ }0 exs ss s p sE e βκκ κ−  = +  + +K ν κ− + and [ ] ( )1 1E e0 βνκ−κ  = −  K . The 
probability that no remaining DDs activate during a mission (field mission survival) is 
given explicitly; see Gaver et al. (2004). Auxiliary randomization as in (b) and (c) 
(dubbed “double stochasticity,” c.f. D. R. Cox (1955), M. S. Bartlett (1955),  
M. S. Bartlett (1967), and D. R. Cox et al. (1980)) can represent environmental 
variation during a mission and/or manufacturing or configuration variability between 
manufactured copies. Appropriate parametric statistical estimation to evaluate such 
expressions is an important problem not yet addressed by the authors. 
 
Note: We present three alternative explicit mathematical formulas for probability of 
field mission survival by Block b+1. These are all directly numerically evaluated on a 
personal computer, or even a handheld calculator, and are useful for checking far 
more elaborate simulations. 
 
2.2 Acquisition of Block b+1 
Let B(b+1) be the total budget to develop, test, and procure Block b+1. Table 1 details 
(average) cost and operational parameters required at this stage. 
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Table 1: Parameters 
Total budget ( )1B b +  2,000 
Development budget M variable 
Development (spiral) time ( )1dT b +  variable 
Rate of development expenditure ( )/ 1dm M T b= +  variable 
Mean number of tests per unit time τ  variable 
Cost Block b/copy/unit ( )mc b  1 
Cost Block b+1/copy/unit ( )1mc b +  1.2 
Cost of a test tc  1 
Cost removing each DD found 
during test rc  3 
Mean mission arrival rate λ  100 
Probability mission success Block b ( )p b  0.4 
Utopian requirement: probability 
mission success Block b+1 ( )* 1p b +  0.85 














Parameter for introduction of DD 3α  2 
Rate of obsolescence Block b ( )bω  0.33 
Rate of obsolescence Block b+1 ( )1bω +  0.2 
Probability DD survives test θ  0.85 
Probability DD survives mission Fθ  0.8 






Here is a breakdown of Block b+1 budget allocation: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) (
( )( )
# 1 1 1 1
1; 1 ;
d m t d
r R d
B b B b M T b c b c T b
c E b T b
τ
τ
+ = + − + −  + +  + 
 − + + D
)1
,   (5) 
where ( )( )1; 1 ;R db T b τ+ +D
( ) ( )( )
 is the number of DDs removed by testing. After 








++ = + . Each of these copies has the same remaining DDs in this 
initial model, and hence has the same probability of field reliability/suitability. 
 
2.3 Obsolescence of Block b and Block b+1 
 
Operational obsolescence is inevitable, and is a powerful reason for Block upgrading. 
Assume that Block b will become obsolete after an independent exponential time 
having mean ( )bω1/ . An important problem not addressed yet explicitly is to develop 
an adaptive inferential policy for one’s own force (B) to conclude that the opposing 
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force (R) has found a countermeasure to B’s asset, such could take the form of first 
occurrence of a “failure run of r (e.g., 5) B mission failures. Such would signal a 
needed change in B’s CONOPS, or a needed block upgrade, or both. After 
obsolescence, the probability of mission success for Block b is ( ) (O )p b p b< ; ( )Op b  
may be close to zero. Assume a fielded Block b+1 can also become obsolete after an 
independent exponential time having mean ( )1bω1/ + . After obsolescence, the 
probability of mission success for Block b+1 is ( ) ( )1 1p bOp b + < + . If Block b 
becomes obsolete before the completion of development and testing for Block b+1, 
then a decision can be made to continue to field Block b, or to field the current  
Block b+1 prematurely. We defer discussion of this possibility to Gaver et al. (2005). 
In this paper, we will assume that Block b is completely ineffective after 
obsolescence; that is, ( ) 0Op b = ; we also assume that Block b+1 is completely 
ineffective after obsolescence. 
λ
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )






















ω λ ω λ ω
  
 =  +  





( )1FN b +
 
2.4 A Basic Decision Problem 
 
Suppose for the present that Block b does not become obsolete before the end of 
development and testing of Block b+1. The decision to be made is whether to use the 
budget remaining after development and testing of Block b+1 to purchase copies of 
Block b+1, or to use it to purchase more copies of Block b. Let each mission use one 
copy of a Block design. Each unit of a Block can be used once. DDs remaining in 
Block b+1 after fielding can cause mission failure. The decision criterion is to 
maximize the expected number of successful missions. The decision is to allocate that 
amount of the budget, B(b+1), to upgrade Block b+1 so the expected number of 
successful missions by the copies of Block b+1 procured with the remaining budget  
is maximized. 
 
Assume missions arrive according to a stationary Poisson process having rate . Let 
( )FN b  be the number of copies of Block b that can be purchased using B(b+1). The 





( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
.             (6) 
A similar expression occurs for the conditional expected number of successful 
missions given the remaining number of DDs if  copies of Block b+1 are 
fielded. Let  
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= + , (7) 
where as before the distribution of ( )( ) ( )( )1; 1 ; 1 ;d db M T b T b τ+ + +D  can be Poisson 




The parameters for the numerical examples appear in Table 1. The total budget for 
development, testing, and procurement of Block b+1 is $2,000K. Development 
budgets $100K, $200K, and $400K are considered. Each of these budgets can be 
spent over an integer time interval length T  of 1 time period, or 5 time periods. The 
rate of DT/OT testing ranges in integer values from 1 to 100 tests per time period. The 
proportionality constant, , has a gamma distribution with mean equal to 0.0002 
and shape parameter 0.4. Table 2 summarizes the gains made by an appropriate 
choice of time for development and testing. If Block b+1 is not developed and units of 
Block b are bought with the budget, then the expected number of mission successes is 




Table 2: Maximum Expected Number of Successes for Block b+1 after Development and Testing; 
[Maximizing Number of Tests]; Total Budget=$2,000K. 
M/T: rate of 
expenditure of 
development budget 
20=100/5 40=200/5 80=400/5 100=100/1 200=200/1 400=400/1 
M/B: fraction of total 
budget used for 
development 
      
0.2=400/2000   365 [40]   
299 
[58] 
0.1=200/2000  385 [35]   
346 
[54]  
0.05 =100/2000 396 [25]   
372 








































E[Prob. Mission Success]  for Block b +1 versus Number of Tests




































Discussion: If Block b+1 is not developed and the development budget is spent to 
acquire copies of Block b, the expected number of mission successes using Block b is 
120. Figure 1 displays the expected number of mission successes for Block b+1 as a 
function of the number of tests for various developmental budgets and developmental 
times. Figure 2 displays the expected probability of mission success as a function of 
the number of tests for various development budgets and development times. As 
Table 2 illustrates, perhaps surprisingly, larger expected number of mission successes 
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and smaller number of tests needed to achieve the maximum are associated with a 
smaller development budget and longer development times. 
 Tables 3 and 4 display the expected probabilities of mission success after 
development and testing for different distributions of K0. The numbers of tests 
performed for the results in Tables 3 and 4 are the same as those displayed in Table 2; 
that is, they are the number of tests for K0 having a gamma distribution with shape 
parameter 0.4 and mean 0.0002, which maximize the expected number of mission 
successes for Block b+1. In Table 3, the distributions considered are K0=0.0002; K0 
having a gamma distribution with shape parameter =0.4 and mean 0.0002; K0 having 
a positive stable law distribution with order equal to the shape parameter of the 
gamma and scale the same as the gamma; K0 having a truncated stable law 
distribution with the same scale and order as the stable and the exponential truncation 
rate, κ, chosen so that the mean is equal to 0.0002. In Table 4, the distributions of K0 
are the same except the shape of the gamma and the order of the stable law are 0.1. 
 
Table 3: Expected Probability of Mission Success for Block b+1 after Development and Testing: 
Constant K0=0.0002; (gamma K0, shape parameter 0.4, and mean 0.0002); {stable K0 with order 
(scale) equal to shape (scale) of gamma}; (truncated stable K0). 
M/T: rate of 
expenditure of 
development budget 
20=100/5 40=200/5 80=400/5 100=100/1 200=200/1 400=400/1 
M/B: fraction of total 
budget used for 
development 
      


































Table 4: Expected Probability of Mission Success for Block b+1 after Development and Testing: 
Constant K0=0.0002; (gamma K0, shape parameter 0.1, and mean 0.0002); {stable K0 with order 
(scale) equal to shape (scale) of gamma}; (truncated stable K0). 
M/T: rate of 
expenditure of 
development budget 
20=100/5 40=200/5 80=400/5 100=100/1 200=200/1 400=400/1 
M/B: fraction of total 
budget used for 
development 
      

































Discussion: The expected probabilities of mission success are nearly equal for the 
moment and shape-matched versions of constant, gamma, and truncated stable K0, 
except for the stable with order β small (0.1). This behavior may be due to the  
much-exaggerated shape of the pure stable law with these shape parameters; there can 
be many small values versus a few very large. The mean number of DDs introduced 
when K0 has a pure (untruncated) positive stable law is infinite and the expected 
probability of mission success after development and testing is much less than the 
others; the smallest expected probabilities of mission success occur for the stable law 
of order 0.1. This suggests the need for a sequential stopping rule, a problem under 
current investigation. 
 
3 Conclusions and Future Program 
 
The problem discussed is simple and generic, and widely encountered in defense 
acquisition. In subsequent work we propose to elaborate on the above conditions and 
issues, and to provide operational tools to guide the timing of evolutionary cycles. We 
will consider the development and testing of systems consisting of subsystems in 
series or in a time-dependent, random pattern elsewhere. We will also consider  
Test-Analyze-Fix-Test (TAFT) testing policies with a sequential stopping rule based 
on first occurrence of a run of successful (no DDs activating) operational tests. 
Simulation and more analysis will be designed to assess the procedure’s robustness. 
Application to Interim Armored Vehicle, IAV (STRYKER) acquisition and preview 
testing is underway. 
 
The preceding initial decision-aiding model illustrates the steps necessary to build a 
case for a new block, and the timing of its initiation. The decision should depend on 
the improvement of performance (effectiveness) achieved in the process of TAFT and 
consequent improvement of reliability (suitability). More elaborate model examples 
are required to exhibit the system-wide capability goals needed for more complex 
12 
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The specific parametric example used for illustration is 
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for 0,  0i ia α> >  for i=1,2. Of course, (8) is hypothetical and speculative, and subject to 
replacement. Note that the overall fraction of possible success  achieved decreases as the 
time-rate of expenditure, m, increases, (the “haste makes waste” effect). The conditional 
expected number of DDs introduced during development is  
dG
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the expected number of DDs introduced is an increasing function of the rate of 
expenditure during development, m. For this parametric form 
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for  having the gamma distribution of (4)                         0K
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